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12 WORKERS OF AMERICA, AFL-CIO,

13 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
14  
15 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

16 COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF  
17 AMERICA, AFL-CIO,

18 Charging Party/Petitioner.

19 And

20 PURPLE COMMUNICATIONS, INC.

21 Employer,

Case No. 21-CA-095151; 21-RC-091531;  
21-RC-091584.

22 **REQUEST FOR SPECIAL  
23 PERMISSION TO APPEAL DECISION  
24 OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE**

25 **361 NLRB NO. 126 (2014)**

26 Pursuant to Section 102.25 of the rules, the Charging Party hereby requests special  
27 permission to appeal the attached Order of the Administrative Law Judge (Exhibit A) closing the  
28 record and refusing to allow the parties to present any evidence on the issues remanded by the  
Board.

When the full Board decided this case, it remanded this matter to the Administrative Law  
Judge.

The Board's remand was very clear. The Board's ORDER states:

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the judge shall afford the parties  
an opportunity to present evidence on the remanded issues and  
shall prepare a supplemental decision...

See pages 17-18 of the Board's Decision and Order Remanding.

1 The Board stated at page 2 of the Decision and Order Remanding:

2 We remand the issue to the judge for him to reopen the record and  
3 afford the parties an opportunity to present evidence relevant to the  
4 standard we adopt today, and the judge for him to prepare a  
5 supplemental decision containing findings of fact and conclusions  
6 of law, and a recommended Order, consistent with this Decision  
7 and Order.

8 The remand Order specifically states that “the judge shall afford the parties an  
9 opportunity to present evidence on the remanded issues.”

10 The Board also clarified this at page 17 of the Decision and Order Remanding:

11 As stated, however, we will remand this aspect of this case to the  
12 administrative law judge for further proceedings consistent with  
13 this decision, including allowing the parties to introduce evidence  
14 relevant to a determination of lawfulness of the Respondent’s  
15 electronic communications policy.

16 The Order of the ALJ, which is attached, not only ignored but repudiated the remand  
17 order. The ALJ has foreclosed the Charging Party from making a further evidentiary record.

18 During prehearing phone conferences, the Administrative Law Judge indicated that he  
19 was considering foreclosing either counsel for the General Counsel or Charging Party from  
20 presenting any evidence if the Respondent did not plan on putting on any evidence on the special  
21 circumstances defense. In response, the Charging Party filed an objection attached as Exhibit B.  
22 The Administrative Law Judge nonetheless issued his Order foreclosing the hearing and rejecting  
23 the Objection without commenting on it. He simply ignored the arguments and offers without  
24 explanation and set a briefing schedule.

25 Nothing in the Board’s Decision and Order Remanding suggests the remand is limited to  
26 allowing only the Respondent to put on evidence only as to whether it has special circumstances  
27 to justify its electronic communications policy. The remand was for not an “issue” but “issues.”  
28 The Board established a new standard and contemplated a remand for the parties to make a full  
record. By foreclosing the Charging Party from presenting any evidence, the ALJ violated the  
clear terms of the Board’s remand.

The ALJ was also misled (if not confused) by the Respondent’s letter attached to the  
ALJ’s Order. The letter from counsel states that the Respondent does not intend to present “any  
*additional* evidence on the special circumstance issue remanded by the Board for hearing in the

1 above-referenced case.” Respondent’s letter (emphasis supplied). As a result, the employer, we  
2 assume, intends to rely on some evidence in the record to establish special circumstances or  
3 otherwise justify its policy. The ALJ was apparently misled and thought this meant that there  
4 would be no claim made of special circumstances. The letter stating that it does not intend on  
5 “submitting any argument to the Administrative Law Judge either by brief or otherwise...” does  
6 not foreclose filing Exceptions or relying on evidence already in the record in a challenge to any  
7 Board Order in a Circuit Court. The letter from counsel for Purple Communications is to the  
8 contrary. The letter leaves this open, and the ALJ erroneously did not carefully read or  
9 understand the position that the Respondent is taking.<sup>1</sup>

10 The Charging Party should be allowed to present evidence that there are no special  
11 circumstances. The Charging Party should be allowed to make an evidentiary record to prove  
12 the circumstances, including free use of the email during work and non-work time, support any  
13 Board decision.

14 Furthermore, nothing in the Board’s Decision and Order Remanding forecloses the  
15 Charging Party from proving that Video Relay Interpreters should have access to the company’s  
16 email during work hours. We have explained this further in the attached objection.

17 There are a number of Board cases where employees have been allowed to use the  
18 company email during work hours. See dissent of Member Miscimarra at footnote 37 and dissent  
19 of Member Johnson at text for footnotes 55-57. See also, *Hitachi Capital Am. Corp*, 361 NLRB  
20 No. 19 (2014). The Board has thus repeatedly found that where employees are allowed to use  
21 the email during work time, they can’t be disciplined because the employer dislikes what is  
22 stated or transmitted on the email where the email involves protected concerted activity. This  
23 issue remains in the case encompassed by the Board’s remand.

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26  
27 <sup>1</sup> The employer is obviously planning a Circuit Court challenge because, under the Board’s  
28 Decision, the policy violates the Act, and a Decision and Order finding a violation is a foregone  
conclusion. If the Respondent was not intent on limiting the record in anticipation of a further  
challenge in a Circuit Court, it could have settled the allegation.

1 The ALJ's Order forecloses the Charging Party from putting on evidence as to the  
2 appropriate remedy (for example, whether posting should be in all facilities, whether it should be  
3 electronic by way of Purple's intranet or otherwise).

4 Finally, although the Board stated that it was not necessary to reach the question of  
5 whether the discrimination test in *Register Guard* should be overruled, see footnote 13, that is an  
6 issue which remains for purposes of any defense which Purple Communications may raise. The  
7 Charging Party wishes to present evidence on that issue.

8 In summary, this Request for Special Permission to Appeal should be granted. The  
9 Appeal should be granted, and the ALJ should be directed to open the record to allow the parties  
10 to present evidence. The Board's remand was clear that the parties were allowed to present  
11 evidence. *Purple Communications* stands as an important precedent, and any further Decision  
12 from the Board with an anticipated Circuit Court challenge should be based on an adequate  
13 record.

14  
15 Dated: February 17, 2015

WEINBERG, ROGER & ROSENFELD  
A Professional Corporation

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18 133337/798685

By: /S/ DAVID A. ROSENFELD  
DAVID A. ROSENFELD  
Attorneys for Charging Party/Petitioner  
COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF  
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**PROOF OF SERVICE  
(CCP §1013)**

I am a citizen of the United States and resident of the State of California. I am employed in the County of Alameda, State of California, in the office of a member of the bar of this Court, at whose direction the service was made. I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within action.

On February 17, 2015, I served the following documents in the manner described below:

**CHARGING PARTY'S REQUEST FOR SPECIAL PERMISSION TO APPEAL  
DECISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE  
361 NLRB NO. 126 (2014)**

- ☐ (BY U.S. MAIL) I am personally and readily familiar with the business practice of Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld for collection and processing of correspondence for mailing with the United States Parcel Service, and I caused such envelope(s) with postage thereon fully prepaid to be placed in the United States Postal Service at Alameda, California.
- ☒ (BY ELECTRONIC SERVICE) By electronically mailing a true and correct copy through Weinberg, Roger & Rosenfeld's electronic mail system from kshaw@unioncounsel.net to the email addresses set forth below.

On the following part(ies) in this action:

Via Email

Robert J. Kane  
STUART KANE  
620 Newport Center Drive, Suite 200  
Newport Beach, CA 92660  
rkane@stuartkane.com

Via Email

Olivia Garcia, Regional Director  
Cecilia Valentine, Attorney  
National Labor Relations Board, Region 21  
888 S. Figueroa Street, Floor 9  
Los Angeles, CA 90017-5449  
olivia.garcia@nlrb.gov  
cecilia.valentine@nlrb.gov

Honorable Paul Bogas  
Administrative Law Judge  
Division Of Judges  
109914<sup>th</sup> Street, NW, Room 5400 East  
Washington, DC 20570-0001  
Paul.bogas@nlrb.gov

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on February 17, 2015, at Alameda, California.

/s/Katrina Shaw  
Katrina Shaw

# EXHIBIT A

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD  
DIVISION OF JUDGES

PURPLE COMMUNICATIONS, INC.

and

Case Nos. 21-CA-095151  
21-RC-091531  
21-RC-091584

COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF  
AMERICA, AFL-CIO

ORDER

The Board, in its Decision and Order dated December 11, 2014, remanded the above-captioned case for further proceedings regarding the Respondent's electronic communications policy. The Board stated that it was overruling its prior decision in *Register Guard*, 351 NLRB 1110 (2007), enfd. in relevant part and remanded sub nom. *Guard Publishing v. NLRB*, 571 F.3d 53 (D.C. Cir. 2009), by "adopting a presumption . . . that employees who have rightful access to their employer's email system in the course of their work have a right to use the email system to engage in Section 7-protected on nonworking time." The Board emphasized that this presumption "is expressly limited to nonworking time." "An employer may rebut the presumption," the Board stated, "by demonstrating that special circumstances necessary to maintain production or discipline justify restricting its employees' rights." "[A]n assertion of special circumstances will require that the employer articulate the interest at issue and demonstrate how that interest supports the email use restrictions it has implemented."

The Respondent, by letter dated February 3, 2015, (attached) notified me that it would not, on remand, contend "that special circumstances, as defined in the Board's decision, exist to justify the business use only restriction that Respondent places on non-working time use of its e-mail system by employees" and would not present any evidence on the subject. Given that, under the Board's decision, it is the Respondent's burden to rebut the presumption by "articulat[ing] the interest at issue" and demonstrating the "special circumstances," no additional evidence need be taken at this time.

The parties have until March 10, 2015, to submit briefs for my consideration. I am affording the parties the opportunity to file briefs, but am not directing them to do so.

SO ORDERED

DATED: February 10, 2015

  
PAUL BOGAS  
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD  
DIVISION OF JUDGES

PURPLE COMMUNICATIONS, INC.

and

Case Nos. 21-CA-095151  
21-RC-091531  
21-RC-091584

COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF  
AMERICA, AFL-CIO

Service Sheet

A copy of the Order including (attached letter by the Respondent dated February 3, 2015) has been served by electronic mail upon the following:

Cecelia Valentine,  
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Los Angeles, CA  
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February 3, 2015

Via Overnight Delivery

Honorable Paul Bogas  
Administrative Law Judge  
Washington, D.C. Office  
1099 14th Street, NW, Room 5400 East  
Washington, DC 20570-0001


Re: Purple Communications, Inc. and Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO  
Cases: 21-CA-095151; 21-RC-091531; and 21-RC-091584

Dear Judge Bogas:

As I informed your honor and counsel for the other parties in this matter in our conference call today, Respondent Purple Communications, Inc. will not be presenting any additional evidence on the special circumstances issue remanded by the Board for hearing in the above-referenced case.

Respondent also will not be submitting any argument to the Administrative Law Judge either by brief or otherwise, contending that special circumstances, as defined in the Board's decision, exist to justify the business use only restriction that Respondent places on non-working time use of its e-mail system by employees.

Very truly yours,



Robert J. Kane

RJK:lmw

cc: NLRB Division of Judges, Washington D.C. [Overnight Delivery]  
Cecelia Valentine [Via E-mail: cecelia.valentine@nlrb.gov]  
David A. Rosenfeld [Via E-mail: drosenfeld@unioncounsel.net]

# EXHIBIT B

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14 NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

15 PURPLE COMMUNICATIONS,

16 Employer,

17 and

18 COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF  
19 AMERICA, AFL-CIO,

20 Charging Party/Petitioner.

Case No. 21-CA-095151; 21-RC-091531;  
21-RC-091584

**CHARGING PARTY/PETITIONER'S  
OBJECTION TO CLOSING OF THE  
RECORD AND OFFER OF PROOF**

22 In a phone conference, the Administrative Law Judge has indicated that he will not allow  
23 the Charging Party to present additional evidence if the Respondent concludes that it will not  
24 provide any evidence on remand. We submit that this is plain error and submit this position  
25 statement to be made part of the record in this case before briefing.

26 The Board stated at page 2:

27 We remand the issue to the judge for him to reopen the record and  
28 afford the parties an opportunity to present evidence relevant to the  
standard we adopt today, and the judge for him to prepare a  
supplemental decision containing findings of fact and conclusions  
of law, and a recommended Order, consistent with this Decision  
and Order.

The remand order specifically states that "the judge shall afford the parties an opportunity  
to present evidence on the remanded issues."

1 The Board went further and stated at page 17:

2 As stated, however, we will remand this aspect of this case to the  
3 administrative law judge for further proceedings consistent with  
4 this decision, including allowing the parties to introduce evidence  
relevant to a determination of lawfulness Respondent's electronic  
communications policy.

5 Nothing in these statements suggests the remand is limited to allowing the Respondent to  
6 put on evidence only as to whether it has special circumstances to justify its electronic  
7 communications policy. The Board established a new standard and contemplated a remand for  
8 the parties to make a record.

9 The Board's ORDER states:

10 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the judge shall afford the parties  
11 an opportunity to present evidence on the remanded issues...

12 The remand was not "issue" but "issues." The remand was not to allow only the  
13 Respondent but to allow the "parties" to present evidence. This Order was quite clear.

14 The Administrative Law Judge focused upon one sentence at page 17 in which the Board  
15 stated: "We will remand this issue to the Judge to allow the Respondent to present evidence of  
16 special circumstances justifying restrictions and imposes on employees' use of its email system."  
17 Such stray statements are not the remand order. The Board's Order clearly states the remand to  
18 the ALJ.

19 The Board thought that, as a matter of due process, the parties (and not just the  
20 Respondent) should be allowed to present evidence based upon its newly established standard for  
21 use of email. This is an issue that had been before the Board for close to 20 years in various  
22 cases. The Board, in a lengthy opinion, evaluated these issues and remanded to the Judge for the  
23 taking of additional evidence. It would violate the Charging Party's due process rights to  
24 foreclose it from presenting evidence where the Board thought that it was appropriate to allow, in  
25 the Administrative Law Judge's view, the Respondent to do so. This was not meant to be a one  
26 way street. Due process works both ways.

27 The Administrative Law Judge erroneously read the Board's decision to remand only for  
28 the sole purpose of allowing the Respondent to present evidence of special circumstances. The  
Board's remand, as noted above, was broader than that. It was clear, particularly from the

1 ORDER provision, that the parties, and not just the Respondent, are allowed to present evidence  
2 on the issues. The ALJ is ultimately bound by the ORDER, not a portion of one sentence from  
3 the discussion in 17 pages. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 41, governing remands, has  
4 been similarly interpreted. The remand is governed by the court's remand, not any stray  
5 discussion in the court's opinion. This ensures that there is no ambiguity in the court's order and  
6 remand.

7 The charging Party proposes to present evidence to show that the company's electronic  
8 communications policy is invalid under section 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3). Among other things, we will  
9 provide evidence as follows:

- 10 1. A consistent use of email and electronic communications by the employer on  
11 issues related to work concerning wages, hours and working conditions. The  
12 employer routinely communicated with video relay interpreters by use of email  
13 and other electronic communications regarding wages, hours and working  
14 conditions;
- 15 2. There will be no interference with or effect on the electronic communications  
16 systems by employees use of the email for protected concerted activity or other  
17 communication about wages, hours and working conditions;
- 18 3. Employees and the employer have consistently used the email system and other  
19 electronic communications systems during "working hours" for purposes of  
20 communicating about wages, hours and working conditions. The use of  
21 electronic communications for protected concerted activity or union activity  
22 cannot be limited simply to non-work hours.
- 23 4. The employer has encouraged and condoned use of the email and electronic  
24 communications systems during work hours for work related purposes, including  
25 communications about wages, hours and working conditions.
- 26 5. Video interpreters are not allowed to be interpreting during all work hours. In  
27 fact, they are required to stop interpreting for certain portions of every hour as an  
28 ergonomic and health and safety issue. As a result, although this time is "work

time” because it is paid, there is no work that they have to perform. During this time they should be allowed to use the email and electronic communications systems.

6. The employer makes available email and electronic communications systems to the interpreters who use them throughout work time as well as non-work time.
7. There will be no interference with productivity or discipline if the employees use the email and electronic communications systems during work time and non-work time.
8. There are no circumstances which justify any prohibition against the employees from using email or electronic communications during non-work time.
9. Employees have used the company’s email and electronic communications systems for communication about work related issues during non-work time with the approval or encouragement of the employer.

These are some of the facts that the charging Party will present. As noted, the Board is very clear to allow remand for both parties to present evidence.

Although the Board noted in a footnote it was not necessary to reach the discrimination issue under *Register-Guard*, see footnote 13, the Charging Party notes that this issue still remains in the case and believes that the above evidence will prove that the employer’s application of the communications policy is discriminatory. It wishes to make a record as noted above about the discriminatory application.

The Administrative Law Judge has furthermore narrowly read the remand regarding the remedy issue. The Board noted that there was no back pay liability or reinstatement obligation. The only remedy as the Board noted is “its remedial obligations [which] will be limited to rescission of the policy and standard notifications to employees.” See pg. 17. As noted above, the remand was broad and allowed both parties to present evidence. The Charging Party will present evidence to establish the standard notifications should include:

1. Email and other electronic communications system posting.

2. Email or electronic communications directly to each video relay interpreter. This will be an appropriate remedy because the employer uses the email to communicate with the employees regarding working conditions.
3. A reading of the notice. This will be an appropriate and standard remedy in this case because an employer routinely reads notices and other information to video interpreters in group meetings.
4. Posting of the notice should be required on the employer's email and electronic communication systems as well as in each of the offices.
5. Employees should be advised of the notice posting because they are routinely advised of notices which they are supposed to read on electronic communication systems. This should apply to the Board Notice.
6. The Notice should be mailed to video relay interpreters who are no longer working for the company.
7. The Notice should be signed to the video relay interpreters.

The Administrative Law Judge too narrowly read the Board's remand. It is plain that it allows the parties to present evidence. The remand is not, as the Administrative Law Judge interpreted, limited simply to the Respondent's choice of whether to present special circumstances. The Charging Party should be allowed to rebut the suggestion that there are any circumstances or any justification to limit the use of email and electronic communications.

For these reasons, the Administrative Law Judge should allow the hearing to go forward so that the Charging Party can present evidence as required and permitted by the remand.

Dated: February 9, 2015

WEINBERG, ROGER & ROSENFELD  
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By: /S DAVID A. ROSENFELD  
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